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in 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I 
Did the District Court err by allowing the agent/fiduciary defendants to rely 
on the uncertainty created by their own wrongful act or omission to defeat the 
claim of its principal(the plaintiffs) where the agent/ fiduciary's act or omission 
was so inconsistent with the obligation undertaken to the principal that it 
represented a tortious breach of it's contract with the principal and where the 
wrongful or tortious act or omission itself made the proof of causation between the 
act and the principal's damages more difficult or impossible to ascertain? The 
standard of appellate review for a trial court's determinations as to standards of 
proof and burden of proof is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co. 133 P.3d 382, 386, 2006 UT 16 (Utah,2006). The issue 
was raised by the plaintiffs below in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Add 45-46. 
II 
Did the District Court err in granting defendant summary judgment based on 
its findings that plaintiff could not prove causal relation to damages where the 
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judgment was based on an affidavit of a witness and the material facts upon which 
defendant relied were contradicted by prior inconsistent statements of the witness 
and other evidence which would not support such judgment. The standard of 
review for a challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of 
law. This Court accords no deference to trial courts' conclusions, but review them 
for correctness. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization v. Tax Com'n 106 P.3d 182, 
184, 2004 UT App 472 (Utah App.,2004). The plaintiffs below opposed 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. Add. 132-170; 386-399. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to 
all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 10, 2002 plaintiffs/appellants filed a complaint in the Sixth District 
Court of Utah for Kane County, the Honorable David L. Mower presiding. The 
verified Complaint sounded in both Contract and Tort. Add. 7-1. On December 22, 
2003, a hearing was held on cross motions for summary judgment. On July 22, 
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2004 the Court issued a ruling denying the motions. Add 220-218. Subsequently 
the case was scheduled for trial. Prior to trial, defendants renewed their motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. 
On March 13, 2006 the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to causation. It is from that March 13, 2006 Order that this appeal is 
taken. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 10, 1999, Plaintiffs/Appellants herein, by letter sent via facsimile to 
Defendants/Appellees engaged the services of Defendants/Appellees Brad Adair 
and Southern Utah Title Company to act as the agent for Plaintiff at a scheduled 
tax sale of certain real property more particularly described as Lot 25, Plat B, Zion 
View Mountain Estates, Kane County, Utah (hereinafter the "subject property"). 
Add. 1. 
The engagement letter recited the agreement between the parties as follows: 
"Southern Utah Title Co., Brad Adair and their employees and agents are hereby 
retained and employed, authorized and directed to purchase by competitive bid the 
property known as Lot #25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates at the tax sale 
scheduled for 20 May 1999. They are authorized to bid up to thirty five thousand 
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dollars ($35,000.00) for the property. This agreement shall be considered to be of 
a fiduciary nature." Add.l. 
On May 14, 1999, Plaintiff caused to be forwarded to the Title Company the 
sum of thirty five thousand dollars ($35,000.00) to be used by the Title Company 
to Purchase the subject property. Add.32. On May 19, 1999, Defendant, Southern 
Utah Title received the wired funds into its account. Add.31. 
The tax ,sale occurred on May 20, 1999. Add. 30. The tax sale was a "cash 
sale" requiring the successful bidder to pay cash for the property by 5:00p.m. the 
day of the sale. Add. 152. Brad Adair and the Title Company were represented by 
Ray Spencer, an employee of the Title Company. Add 26, 18. When the subject 
property was auctioned, Ray Spencer failed to make a bid for the subject property 
after the bid price reached eleven thousand ($11,000.00). Add. 27, 26. The Real 
Property was sold to William Pringle, at the tax sale for eleven thousand, two 
hundred fifty dollars ($11,250.00). Add. 27, 26. The subject property was 
subsequently resold for seventy five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). Add 118. 
After suit was filed, the Defendants produced an affidavit, dated February 2, 
2001, from the successful auction bidder, William C. Pringle, stating "Had the 
bidding gone up to Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), I have no doubt 
that I would have bid still higher on this property...." Add. 121, 119, ]f 11. 
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After Defendants produced the Affidavit of William C. Pringle, Plaintiffs 
produced the affidavit of Stephen H Schwartz, dated August 27, 2003 averring 
that "On May 24, 1999 I spoke with William Pringle. He told me that he would not 
have bid more than $20,000.00 for the property, that he had only brought 
$30,000.00 to the auction and that he had anticipated bidding on other properties. 
Add. 156. Mr. Pringle did buy another property at that auction. Add 26, 28. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs produced the transcript and tape recording of a 
conversation of June 21, 1999 between Stephen H Schwartz and William C. 
Pringle in which, Mr. Pringle acknowledged that with respect to their May 24, 
1999 conversation, "I might have said you know, I was going to quit at 20 
[$20,000.00]." Add. 150, 138. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs produced, from the records of the County Recorder, 
an abstracted compilation of all of William C. Pringle's Kane County Tax Sale 
Bids. Add. 132. The records showed that in 17 other auctions other than the one at 
issue, Mr. Pringle had never bid in excess of $5,250.00 or of the 'market value' of 
the property auctioned (the market value of the subject property was $8,349.00 on 
the date of the auction); and that Mr. Pringle had been outbid in 6 of the 17 
auctions 
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Plaintiffs also produced the Minutes of the May 1999 Kane County Tax 
Sale and the bid records which showed the 'market value' of the subject property 
on the date of the sale; the bidding record of the sale; and the purchase by Mr. 
Pringle of another property offered for sale. Add 26, 28. 
William Pringle developed and traded properties as a business Add.84, 89, 
296, 336. 
William Pringle had a stroke on July 10, 2003 which may render him not 
competent to testify. Add. 306-305. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
The Trial Court erred in denying judgment to plaintiffs and granting the 
defendants judgment because it was error to place the burden of the proof of 
causation on the plaintiffs where the fiduciary and agent Defendants' failure to bid 
as instructed represented a tortious breach of it's contract with it's principal and 
where that same wrongful or tortious act made the proof of causation between the 
act and the principal's damages more difficult or impossible to ascertain. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
The agreement of the Defendants to bid for the Plaintiffs at the tax auction 
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created the fiduciary relationship of principal to agent between the parties: 
" §1. Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject 
to his control, and consent by the other so to act. 
§13. Agent as a Fiduciary 
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency. 
§14. Control by Principal 
A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to 
matters entrusted to him. 
American Law Institute. Restatement of Agency, Second 
This relationship carried with it certain duties and responsibilities: 
§377. Contractual Duties 
A person who makes a contract with another to perform services as an agent 
for him is subject to a duty to act in accordance with his promise." 
§385. Duty to Obey 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to obey all 
reasonable directions in regard to the manner of performing a service that he has 
contracted to perform.***" 
§424 Agents to Buy or Sell 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent employed to buy or sell is subject to a duty 
to the principal, within the limits set by the principal's directions, to be loyal to 
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the principal's interest and to use reasonable care to obtain terms which best 
satisfy the manifested purposes of the principal." 
American Law Institute.Restatement of Agency, Second. 
The failure of the Defendants to bid as instructed created liability in the 
Defendants in both tort and contract action: 
§400. Liability for Breach of Contract 
An agent who commits a breach of his contract with his principal is subject to 
liability to the principal 
§401. Liability for Loss Caused 
An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by any breach of 
duty. 
Comment: 
a. Action of tort or on the contract of employment The relation between 
principal and agent is always consensual but not always contractual...[I]f a paid 
agent does something wrongful, either knowing it to be wrong or acting 
negligently, the principal may have an either an action of tort or an action of 
contract. Id. 
Utah employs a three part test in breach of contract actions: 
"First, plaintiff must establish that a legal right has been invaded. Second, 
plaintiff must establish that there is a causal connection between the legal wrong 
suffered and the damages claimed. Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 193, 309 P.2d 802, 805 (1957); Terry v. Panek, 
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631 P.2d 896, 897 (1981). Third, Plaintiff must demonstrate the amount of 
damages with sufficient certainty to permit the factfinder to make an award, 
although damages need not be proven with precision. Winsness v M.J. Conoco 
Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1979); 5A Corbin, Contracts, § 
1022(1964)." 
Turtle Mgmt, Inc. v. Haggis Mgrnt, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah, 1982). 
The failure of Defendants to act as instructed (ie., to continue to bid until 
the bid price reached thirty five thousand dollars) represents the "legal invasion" 
or breach of Plaintiffs right to expect action in conformity with their express 
instructions. The Trial Court correctly found that the Plaintiffs' had met their 
burden in this regard in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
liability. 
With regard to the issue of causal connection; it is clear that the failure of 
Defendant Spencer to bid caused Plaintiff to lose any opportunity to purchase the 
property. This same wrongful act or omission created uncertainty in fact as to what 
the property would have sold for had the Defendants bid as instructed. Without the 
continued bidding of Spencer, the bidding ceased; hence it is not known what the 
ultimate selling price would have been had the Spencer not breached the contract. 
The Court below found that "...Plaintiffs have not offered evidence sufficiently 
probative which tends to prove the proposition that for some sum of money up to 
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and including the sum of $35,000.00, Plaintiffs would have been the prevailing 
bidders..." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, March 13, 2006. 
Add.461,18. 
Plaintiffs urge this Court to find that the lower court erred in placing the 
burden of proof as to what the sales price would have been upon the Plaintiff in 
this case because the very uncertainty in this regard was caused by the wrongful 
act of the Defendants. Although the general rule is that the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof as to all elements of its case including causality, Sumsion v. 
Streator-Smitk Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), courts have long held that 
the burden of loss in situations such as the one sub judice rests with Defendants, 
not Plaintiffs: 
"the most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the 
wrongdoer [] bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created... 
the wrongdoer may not object to the plaintiffs reasonable estimate of the cause 
of injury and of its amount, supported by the evidence, because not based on 
more accurate data which the wrongdoer's misconduct has rendered 
unavailable." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265, 90 L.Ed 652, 
660-661 (1946) (emphasis added). 
"... it is not the privilege of him whose wrongful act caused the loss to hide 
behind the uncertainties inherent in the very situation his wrong has created...." 
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Wycko v. Gnodke936l Mich. 331, 105 N.W. 2d 118 (1960); Wilson v. Wylie, 86 
N.M. 9, 518 P.2d 1213, 1223 (1974) [concurring opinion]." 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request this Honorable 
Court reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions that the District 
Court grant plaintiffs a presumption that had the Defendants not tortiously 
breached their contract with Plaintiffs, that the Plaintiffs would have successfully 
purchased the property at the next bidding increment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
II 
The Court below erred in granting Defendant summary judgment because 
the record contains evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer that had the 
Defendants bid as instructed, Plaintiffs would have successfully purchased the 
property within the limits of the instruction accepted by Defendants. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
II 
Utah courts do not favor the granting of summary judgment when the issue 
is one of causation: 
"...questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are generally for the 
fact-trier, court or jury, to determine. [State v. Standard Oil Co., 3 Ariz.App. 
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389, 414 P.2d 992 (1966); Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 158 Mont. 369, 
492 P.2d 926 (1971); LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash.2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 
(1975).| \ part) should not be deprived of the privilege of having such an 
adjudication of his claims unless it appears that even upon the facts claimed by 
hum In null I not establish a basis for rccoven | St i Richards v. Anderson, 9 
Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 59 (1959); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 
(1975).] Moreover, when there is doubt about the matter, it should be resolved 
in favor oi permitting the part> to go to trial. [Butler v. Sports Haven 
International, Utah, 563 P.2d 1245 (1977)]." 
Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 58 ' I1 Id 130, 133 (Utah, 1978). 
"Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d w/ 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an 
issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 
854 P M s»Sb, 000 (Utah \|i|> ) i citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P M 135b 
(Utah 1993). In other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element 
of causation on summary judgment. 
...Utah courts have recognized that "[f]act-sensitive cases ... do not lend 
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v. Estate of 
BernardoM% P.2d 1097,1101 (Utahl995).The Utah Supreme Court recently 
pointed out that M[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not 
weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry shouM hr ^ h 'ihei man ual issues 
of fact exist." Id. at 1100. The court also observed that "[i]t is not the purpose 
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of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments 
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties 
the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts 
as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Id. 
at 1101 (quoting Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)). 
Moreover, " VY only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.'" Id. 
(quoting Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 193)." 
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App., 1996). 
In the case under consideration, the court below determined that a sworn 
statement of the witness, William C. Pringle, signed two years after the sale, that 
he would have bid more than the Defendants were authorized to bid conclusive as 
to the issue of causation. In granting summary judgment, the lower court of 
necessity had to find that facts and inferences supporting the Plaintiffs' claim did 
not rise to the level of materiality. 
The sworn statement of the Plaintiff that the witness, William C. Pringle had 
told him only five days after the auction he had taken only $30,000.00 to the 
auction and that he would have bid only $20,000.00 on the property. The 
statements are admissible as both prior inconsistent statements, and, if the witness 
appears to testify, substantive evidence. UTAH R. EVID., Rule 801(d)(1); State v. 
-13-
Monies, 8 4 0 P.2d 543 (1! • :;•- : ^ 9 1 ) . E v e n v- - r e Mi Prii igl< " t< ) I i€ i n u v n ill: ible 
at trial, the statement that he had taken only $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 to the auction and that he 
w a s bidding on other property. Neither statement is hearsay w h e n presented for the 
proposit ion that Mr. Pringle w o u l d have bid less than $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 because neither 
statement is offered to p r o v e the truth o f the matter asserted. I T ' ^ n R, Ev i r> vule 
* = v - - . t 
granted, 125 KJ>u ivl ( - 0 0 5 ) ; Stai> Olsen, 860 Pzd j 3 _ : &. 1993 ; . i iese 
latter statements, w h e n taken together with the fact that the tax sale is a cash sale, 
lend credence to the inference that one w h o travels from Sun (" i i ) 5 Arizona to an 
auction in Kanab, Utah might be expected to bring with h im the cash he is wi l l ing 
to spend and \\n>- ., * . i \ ^ u k ; ui . ,; o "lore than $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 for the subject 
proper \i , * •.. •. . • •«.• -e u u v , ,-. N. i*uh, vie^u- suff icient 
doubi ubou! '*'>•••»•-*-*• • • - ! . . *. • . h:r, ing 
an adjudication o f their claims. 
In addition, there is ev idence in the form o f the fuel compi la t ion that s h o w s 
that Mr. Pringle, w h o made something o f a business out o f buying and sel l ing the 
p-*-;vfi,e<- . . munity where the subject property is located, has not, iti I 
other aiK'lion1' bid a U n r Vv'50.00 l»>r a proper!) , nor 11,i-, he bid aho\c ihe market 
value for any property, otl iei tl lan suuj^ • , . • • : • ^ M . . m.Tpretatior I of 
-14-
the evidence is that Mr. Pringle is a value shopper, not one who is likely to bid 
more than four times the market value of a property (which he would have had to 
do in order to be the successful bidder had the Defendants not breached the 
contract). Appellants submit that this is the type of fact intensive determination 
that is better left to the trier of fact than the court in a summary judgment 
proceeding. 
The lower court found that the evidence as to the issue of proximate cause 
would lead to conjecture and cited Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 2003 UT App 438, (Utah App, 2003). App. 462, Para 5. Indeed 
as this Court said in Thurston, "(cl)emonstrating material issues of fact with 
respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 
if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that 
alleged negligence and the injury." Id., 83 P.3d at 395-396. Here however, unlike 
Thurston and Sums ion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), 
(also cited by the lower Court) the evidence is clear that the loss occasioned by the 
Plaintiffs was directly the result of the failure of the Defendants to bid. 
Once Defendant Spencer tortiously breached the contract by ceasing to bid 
as instructed, the loss of the property was a foregone conclusion. The inference 
clearly available is that but for his failure to bid, the Plaintiff would have 
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pi 11 cl lased tl ic pi opei ty 1 1 le successful b idder ' s various statements as to what he 
would have bid are at best quest ions to be sorted by the trier of fact. Those 
statements do itot lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the Defendants ' acts and 
omiss ions were not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs ' loss. Any further amount 
that the third party bidder (IV li , Prii igle) would I lave bid was put at risk of pi oof by 
Defendai its by 1:1 ieii: faili it. ,:" t : bid, 
"The negligence of the defendant cannot be excluded as one of the 
actual causes of the accider \ss it can be said with certainty that, 
even if the defendant had not been negligent, the accident would 
nevertheless have happened. It is not enough to speculate "that the 
same harm might possibly have been sustained had the actor not 
been negligent." (Emphasis added). 
Res ta te - r of Torts . £ 
( : : : Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co., 623 F.2d 2405 247 (2d 
Cir. 1980). Plaintiff was burned w h e n she inadvertently brushed perspirat ion from 
her face with a hand that had highly caustic liquid resin hardening agent. The 
appeal from the trial j u d g e ' s refusal to grant a directed verdict or N O V involved 
the adequacy of warnings on the resin container . 1 1 101 is ii i tl ic c ot itaii ici did :oi itain 
warn ings conce* - * *= »ry was 
that 1:1; le warnings i a r to warn of the severity of the burn. Defendant ' s 
unsuccessful argument was that even though it was negl igent , failure to provide 
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adequate warnings was not the cause of the inadvertent touching that caused the 
burn; Smith v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 856 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1988), 
Plaintiff, injured by co-employee claimed employer's negligence in not reporting 
or disciplining co-employee for violent behavior caused employee to shoot and 
injure plaintiff. Trial court's grant of NOV reversed; employer's negligence could 
not, as a matter of law be found not to have been a cause of plaintiff s injuries. 
Plummer v. McCall, 179 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763-764 (1958); Rigg v. State, 284 
A.D179, 131 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (1954). 
The facts of this case, those things which actually occurred, are not in the 
least bit speculative. A Defendant failed to bid as instructed. The next bid was 
within the range of the defendant's authority. It was the defendant's failure to bid 
which caused the bidding to end, not the bidding of William Pringle. As a matter 
of fact there was no event or actor which intervened between the defendant's 
failure to act and the end of the auction. 
An independent intervening agent such as to break the casual connection 
...must be (1) independent, self created, not itself the product of the wrongful 
act; (2) it must intervene; (3) "It must divert and not merely hasten natural 
effect of the wrong." (emphasis added). 
Ehalt v. McCarthy 138 P.2d 639, 646 (Utah 1943) citing Bohlen on Torts, page 29. 
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Finaly, the lower Court found that because of the speculative nature of what 
the third party bidder would have bid had the auction continued, damages were too 
speculative and the claim must fail. Add 462, Para 6. Of course, this would mean 
that any claim for breach of this type of contract must also iai> i he law of I Jtah 
does n( :. . i a resi: leen establisl led I Jtah 
allows he a war images, even in llle absence of exact determinatioii, if 
reasonable minds could reasonably determine the evidence to support them. 
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984) 
Cook Associates Inc. v Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); Terry v. Pane, 631 P. 
2d 896 (Utah, 1981); Winsness v. M J ^onoco Distributors, Inc., 593 J\ Id I KM 
(Utah, 1979); Dunn v Mackay% Burto; -. • rray and Thermion. :N- ' \\ S()4 
(Utah, 1978). Appellai it: •- ' a damages, again, it woulu be 
inequitable to allow the appellees to afford themselves the advantage of the same 
wrongful act which constituted the tortious breach of their contract with appellants 
to avoid the payment of damages. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request this 
11 ( ) r i o t a b 1 e ( '""' o i 11 1 re v er s e 11 i e j i i d g I i: i e n t o f th e D i str i c t C ' c > i 11 t a I i d i e n. \ a i i d 11 i e m a tter 
for a ti ial or i tl ic i i ici; its. 
Respectfully submitted this l day of August, 2006. 
Stepnen H Schwartz 
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